CRIMINAL LAW—AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT DECISION-MAKING ON CRIMINAL LAW FROM 1995 TO 2014 by Thomas Gray
Western New England Law Review
Volume 38 38 (2016)
Issue 2 Article 4
1-1-2016
CRIMINAL LAW—AN EMPIRICAL
ASSESSMENT OF MASSACHUSETTS
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT DECISION-
MAKING ON CRIMINAL LAW FROM 1995
TO 2014
Thomas Gray
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.
Recommended Citation
Thomas Gray, CRIMINAL LAW—AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
DECISION-MAKING ON CRIMINAL LAW FROM 1995 TO 2014, 38 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 285 (2016),
http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol38/iss2/4
285
CRIMINAL LAW—AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF 
MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT DECISION-MAKING 
ON CRIMINAL LAW FROM 1995 TO 2014 
Thomas Gray * 
 
A key component of America’s adversarial, case-based system 
of law is that each case usually produces a winner, someone 
who benefits from the application of a legal rule to the facts of 
their controversy.  Of all cases, winners and losers in criminal 
law are most significant because losing often means a 
considerable loss in personal freedom.  This Article analyzes 
the winners and losers of criminal appeals before the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court as a way of trying to 
learn about how that court conducts its business and makes 
decisions in one of its most crucial functions—being the final 
arbiters of justice in state criminal law.  The results indicate a 
court that rules overwhelmingly against defendants on appeal, 
but that has drifted by a small amount in a pro-defendant 
direction over time.  A key feature of the court’s decisions is 
unanimity—it decides the vast majority of criminal appeals 
without dissent.  There is also no strong connection between the 
party that appointed the justice and how they vote, implying 
that partisanship does not play a strong role in how the court 
decides criminal cases. 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the consistent goals of legal process scholars is to 
understand how judges come to their decisions.1  This process has 
intellectual and historical value from providing insight to 
understand and explain how decisions are reached: why do the 
circumstances end with this result?  Additionally, this process has 
important contemporary civic value for understanding how our 
governing and judicial systems work.  We must understand how 
* The author is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Politics at the 
University of Virginia.  The author would like to thank the Western New England 
University Law Review staff for their diligent editorial assistance. 
1. See Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin & Matthew M. Schneider, On the 
Effective Communication of the Results of Empirical Studies, Part I, 59 VAND. L. REV. 
1811, 1816–17 (2006). 
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existing institutions and actors function to completely understand 
important social factors, such as the “carceral state,”2 racial 
disparities in criminal sentencing,3 and the independence and 
separation of the branches of government.  Further, understanding 
the judicial decision-making process has practical value by 
providing a basis to make informed predictions of future 
jurisprudence.4  This is crucially important for lawyers who must 
build their cases and arguments around their perception of what 
position a judge is likely to take. 
While reading individual cases is a meaningful way to gain 
insight to a justice’s jurisprudence and thinking on a topic, there 
are other ways to complement this approach.  The quantitative 
empirical analysis of court outputs is one such method.  The benefit 
of this approach is largely in its ability to aggregate beyond the 
individual case to see the patterns in judicial behaviors—across 
time and in various circumstances.5  A justice may be known for 
writing a particular opinion limiting law enforcement’s investigative 
powers, but may have otherwise spent years upholding law-
enforcement actions in less salient or widely read cases.  
Understanding a justice’s theoretical articulation and argument and 
their actual, repeated behavior is a significant part of 
understanding how judges exercise judicial authority.  This Article 
analyzes votes of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
(“SJC”) justices cast over a twenty-year period and investigates 
what insights might be drawn from their actions when evaluated in 
the aggregate. 
I. SEPARATING DECISIONS AND OUTCOMES 
Each case typically produces two distinct outputs.  First, the 
primary focus of legal academic discourse is the legal rule.  The 
legal rule is comprised of interpretations, guidelines, definitions, 
and explanations that collectively constitute, in the words of Chief 
2. See, e.g., Vesla M. Weaver & Amy E. Lerman, Political Consequences of the 
Carceral State, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 817, 818 (2010) (defining the carceral state as 
“the totality of this spatially concentrated, more punitive, surveillance and punishment-
oriented system of governance”). 
3. See, e.g., David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in 
Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.&L. & ECON. 285 (2001). 
4. See, e.g., Jonathan P. Kastellec, The Statistical Analysis of Judicial Decisions 
and Legal Rules with Classification Trees, 7 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 204 
(2010). 
5. See Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal 
Scholarship: Judicial Decision Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 
819 (2002). 
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Justice John Marshall, “what the law is.”6  Second, the application 
of the legal rule to the facts of the case results in a decision for the 
parties before the court.  In short, someone wins while someone 
else loses.7  Together these two outputs form the precedential 
weight of a case: stipulating a rule for lower courts to apply, and 
providing an example application. 
This Article focuses exclusively on the winners and losers of 
cases.  While the legal rules themselves are of great importance, the 
winners and losers are also very informative about judicial 
decision-making.  This Article specifically focuses on the winners 
and losers in the most critical type of cases a judge decides—
criminal appeals.  In these, whether a defendant wins often 
determines whether, or for how long, the defendant will go to 
prison.  Additionally, when the legal rule application leads to the 
defendant’s defeat, prosecutorial-leaning precedence is created to 
be applied in subsequent criminal appeals. 
Examining winners in the aggregate offers valuable insight as 
well.  States’ highest courts, such as the SJC, have a high-volume 
caseload, producing a constant stream of legal rulings.  The 
complexity of these rules makes them difficult to analyze at a level 
much larger than a small group.  The complexity of many legal 
rules makes their application easily distinguishable.  As a result, 
decisions that rely on the same legal rule may only be analyzed 
with cases carrying near parallel factual circumstances.  Thus, it is 
difficult to see patterns in decision-making behavior over time.  
Conversely, justices can be more easily analyzed and compared in 
the aggregate by looking at case outcomes.  For example, potential 
comparisons include: separate justices to each other, individual 
justices at differing points in their careers, and the appointees of 
different governors. 
II. THE DATA 
The starting point to build the necessary dataset for this 
Article is an existing dataset of all SJC opinions from 1995 to 2010.8  
From this, all criminal appeals decided by that court are removed.  
To cover a larger range of time, Hall and Windett’s work is 
supplemented by adding criminal appeals from 2011 to 2014.9  The 
6. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
7. Kastellec, supra note 4. 
8. Matthew Hall & Jason Windett, New Data on State Supreme Court Cases, 13 
ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 427, 433 (2013). 
9. To do this, all cases with a Lexis Headnote containing the word “criminal” 
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result is a final dataset of all criminal law decisions by the SJC 
spanning a twenty-year period, from 1995 to 2014.  Aggregately, a 
sufficient period for inquiry is created for meaningful analysis. 
The Hall and Windett data do not provide information on the 
crucial question for this Article’s analyses: who won the case.10  
Instead, they provide the disposition: whether the lower court 
ruling was overturned, affirmed, or otherwise disposed.11  By cross-
referencing the lower court’s ruling12 with Hall and Windett’s 
provided disposition, the winner of each case is thereby 
determined.  The logistical determination of “winners” is more 
straightforward, albeit more tedious, than the substantive 
determination of what it means to “win.”  In the simplest cases, the 
defendant wins when the SJC accepts the challenge raised in full, 
reversing the lower court’s ruling.  Consider, for example, 
Commonwealth v. Tavarez, in which the Commonwealth filed an 
interlocutory appeal to overturn the Superior Court’s suppression 
of surreptitiously recorded evidence.13  The court rejected the 
Commonwealth’s claim and thus upheld the ruling leaving the 
evidence suppressed.14  In this case, Tavarez, the defendant, is a 
clear “winner.” 
In contrast, the defendant clearly “loses” when the court 
rejects all their challenges and the lower court’s disposition is 
upheld in its entirety.  For example, in Commonwealth v. Bishop, 
Walter Bishop challenged his murder conviction on five different 
claimed failures of the trial process.15  Five justices of the SJC 
rejected each of Bishop’s claims.16  In this example, the court 
clearly ruled against Bishop, and he is classified as “losing” the 
appeal. 
Everything in between these two clear categories is a gray 
area.  In a small number of cases, the court will accept one of the 
defendant’s challenges, but reject others.  For these cases 
determining a “winner” is difficult.  For example, in 
Commonwealth v. Mello, Louis Mello appealed three convictions, 
were added.  This approach may not be exhaustive, but should be approximately 
correct.   
10. Hall & Windett, supra note 8. 
11. Id. at 431. 
12. This was determined from a variety of sources, including the recitation in the 
case itself, and/or the case syllabus, and/or the case summary. 
13. Commonwealth v. Tavarez, 945 N.E.2d 329, 330 (Mass. 2011). 
14. Id. 
15. Commonwealth v. Bishop, 963 N.E.2d 88, 90–91 (Mass. 2012). 
16. Id. at 91. 
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two for murder and one for arson.17  The court vacated the arson 
conviction and affirmed both murder convictions.18  It is difficult to 
devise a consistent system to classify cases of this type as each 
party, by the definition used above, “wins.”  Because these cases 
represent less than ten percent of criminal cases in Massachusetts, 
they are excluded from all subsequent analyses.19 
Finally, individual justices’ votes are examined.  All votes for 
the majority’s disposition (including concurrences) are counted as 
votes for a pro-defendant outcome when the defendant “wins.”  
The sources for the justices’ votes come from the Hall and Windett 
dataset20 and this author’s own research for 2011 to 2014.  Those 
justices who either wrote or joined a dissenting opinion constitute 
dissenters.  Thus, the dissenters in a disposition upholding the 
defendant’s conviction are deemed pro-defendant votes by the 
dissenting justices.  Justices not participating in the vote are given 
no value.  These vote tallies are dichotomous and thus can easily be 
aggregated and combined into a simple percentage. 
  
17. Commonwealth v. Mello, 649 N.E.2d 1106, 1109–10 (Mass. 1995). 
18. Id. at 1120.  
19. Attempted methodologies to incorporate these cases include treating all cases 
in which a defendant won at least one challenge resulting in a pro-defendant ruling.  
These did not substantially alter any of the patterns and results presented in this 
Article. 
20. Hall & Windett, supra note 8. 
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the wheels of justice moving efficiently.  This is because higher 
courts are more likely to hear criminal appeals with little merit to 
ensure a defendant’s freedom is not erroneously compromised.  
These facts together mean that many cases with little merit make it 
to the high court where the convictions are confirmed, thereby 
inflating the number of defendant losses. 
Second, the rate of pro-defendant votes closely matches the 
rate of pro-defendant decisions.  There is a clear reason for this: 
unanimity.23  This topic is discussed, infra Part VI, but it is 
important to remain cognizant that the vast majority of SJC 
decisions are unanimous.  This means that votes and outcomes are 
nearly perfectly aligned. 
Finally, there is an upward trend in the data, with more pro-
defendant rulings in later years.  However, this upward trend is 
substantially driven by appeals from 2010 and 2012, while 2011 is a 
below-average year.  The peaks of 2010 and 2012 may be explained 
by the random variation in the release date of decisions, with a 
cluster of pro-defendant rulings released on the December side of 
the 2010–11 divide and pro-Commonwealth rulings released on the 
January side of the 2011–12 divide.  Still, even if these peaks were 
removed, the ten-year baseline from 2005 to 2014 is higher than the 
ten-year baseline from 1995 to 2004.  While the difference between 
each ten-year period is only about four percentage points, it’s a 
meaningful shift of fifteen to twenty percent given how low the 
rates are on average. 
  
23. See Peter J. Coughlan, In Defense of Unanimous Jury Verdicts: Mistrials, 
Communication, and Strategic Voting, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 375 (2000). 
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apply existing constitutional and statutory law.  This is especially 
true in criminal law, where the same factors that explained 
defendants’ overall low rate of success before the SJC may also 
explain some of the court’s unanimity.  Many cases are likely not 
strong appeals because convicted defendants have no cost in 
making an appeal and little to lose if they have been sentenced to 
prison.  And defendants convicted of first-degree murder have a 
right to appeal directly to the SJC.26 
It is likely, however, that some cases do feature some 
disagreement between the justices that does not appear in the final 
decision.27  The justices’ heavy workload28 forces them towards 
unanimity, and collegiality norms mean that justices only dissent in 
rare cases (in these data, only seven percent of the time) when their 
disagreement is sufficiently stark and important to merit the time 
and effort necessary to craft a competing opinion. 
V. NOT PLAYING WITH A FULL BENCH 
While cases themselves are “unanimous,” this does not mean 
that every justice on the court voted the same, but instead that all 
justices who participated voted the same.  The number of 
participating justices in a case ranges from four to seven.  For 
example, Commonwealth v. Carrierre,29 a case about the joint-
venture exception to the hearsay rule, was heard by just four 
justices,30 while cases announced in the days immediately preceding 
or following Carrierre were heard by five, six, or seven justices.31  
26. ELSPETH B. CYPHER, CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 63:17, 63:19 
(Mass. Prac. 4th ed. 2015).  
27. Consider, for example, when a court unanimously vacates or alters the ruling 
of a single justice.  In Bynum v. Commonwealth, the Court vacated the ruling of a 
single justice of the SJC in a unanimous opinion.  This implies that, at least initially, one 
justice of the Court came to a different conclusion that is now lost in the unanimity of 
the final decision.  Bynum v. Commonwealth, 711 N.E.2d 138, 139 (Mass. 1999). 
28. See About the Supreme Judicial Court, MASS.GOV, http://www.mass.gov/ 
courts/court-info/sjc/about/ [https://perma.cc/6LT2-6WTV] (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).  
The Court typically decides about 200 cases a year, with an additional 600 cases heard 
by single justices.  Id. 
29. 18 N.E.3d 326 (Mass. 2014). 
30. Id. at 329–30 (Justices Spina, Corda, Duffly, and Lenk presiding). 
31. Commonwealth v. Garcia, 18 N.E.3d 654, 657 (Mass. 2014) (heard by five 
justices, with Justices Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, and Lenk presiding); 
Commonwealth v. LaChance, 17 N.E.3d 1101, 1102 (Mass. 2014) (heard by six justices, 
with Justices Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, and Lenk presiding); 
Commonwealth v. Rollins, 18 N.E.3d 670, 673 (heard by seven justices, with Justices 
Gants, Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, and Hines presiding).  It is this variation 
in bench composition that explains most of the variation in how cases are decided. 
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hears, the gap between ninety-three percent and forty-one percent 
is considerable. 
Due to the unanimity between the SJC justices, these data are 
not ideal for more sophisticated analyses of individual justice 
preferences for pro-defendant outcomes, such as vote scaling35 or 
Item Response Theory.36  These methods rely on differentiating 
individual justices’ choices within each voting opportunity (in this 
situation, justices’ votes within each individual case).  They use 
differing votes to identical questions to simultaneously estimate 
ideological locations for both justices and the cases themselves 
(such as, how hard it was, based on the particular nature of the 
case, to vote in favor of the defendant).  All of this requires 
differences in votes to reveal information about the case itself.  
Thus, unanimity makes cases uninformative using these methods. 
Despite the problems that unanimity poses, it can still be 
informative to investigate justices’ votes.  For instance, when a 
large percentage of cases reviewed are decided unanimously, those 
fewer cases with split decisions invoke greater scrutiny—if only for 
not being unanimous.  In such cases, the arguments on each side 
were sufficiently strong as to win at least one vote.  The overall 
average on these votes is about forty-eight percent in favor of 
defendants, which fits the idea that non-unanimous cases represent 
more ambiguous legal questions, where the odds of either party 
winning are much closer to an even proposition.  Non-unanimous 
cases are more likely to reveal individual justices’ interpretations of 
criminal law, compared to unanimous decisions.  Since all justices 
start with the same precedential and statutory base, but reach 
different conclusions, these datum reflect differences between the 
justices. 
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/SB_votesplit_OT14.pdf 
[perma.cc/82D4-YDLV] (last visited Feb. 15, 2016) (referring to most cases in this 
dataset as meritless). 
35. See generally KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, IDEOLOGY AND 
CONGRESS (2007); see also Boris Shor & Nolan McCarty, The Ideological Mapping of 
American Legislatures, 105 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 530 (2011). 
36. See generally Andrew Martin & Kevin Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point 
Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 
POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002); Joshua Clinton, Simon Jackman, & Douglas Rivers, The 
Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 355 (2004); but see 
Matthew Hall, Jeffrey Harden, & Jason Windett, Estimating Dynamic Ideal Points for 
State Supreme Courts, 23 POL. ANALYSIS 461 (2015).  
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variation in the unanimous cases largely comes from which justices 
happen to participate in which cases. 
VII. PARTISAN JUSTICE: DO POLITICS EXPLAIN VARIATION 
IN VOTES? 
  The most prominent theory of judicial decision-making in 
judicial politics literature is the attitudinal model, most fully 
articulated by Segal and Spaeth.40  The attitudinal model posits, 
simply, that justices’ rulings are based largely on their preferred 
policy goals.41  Each case represents an opportunity for a justice to 
influence state policy on the topic in question.42 
Within criminal law, this means that justices have their 
opportunity to determine how punitive the state will be, how much 
it will empower law enforcement, and how high a bar it will set for 
prosecutors to attain a conviction.43  The attitudinal model posits 
that justices’ positions will be determined exclusively by the 
outcome the justice wants on these policy goals, ignoring existing 
law and precedent.44  While admittedly simplistic, it has had strong 
empirical power for explaining judicial decision making in many 
judicial contexts. 
In the context of the cases analyzed in this Article, the 
attitudinal model’s predictions would be that justices vote in 
criminal law cases to achieve the policy outcomes that they prefer.  
Liberal justices would prefer more pro-defendant outcomes while 
more conservative justices would prefer more pro-prosecution 
outcomes. 
To investigate whether the data analyzed in this Article 
support this proposition at all, one would need some sense of what 
individual justices think about criminal law; what are their policy 
preferences?  But this is a very difficult exercise.  While their votes 
are an interesting piece of evidence, it would be tautological to use 
the votes to explain the votes.  In addition, justices rarely publicly 
reveal their own beliefs and positions.45  When they do, it is likely 
40. See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (The Press Syndicate of the 
University of Cambridge 2002). 
41. Id. at 86–88. 
42. Id. at 1–3. 
43. Id.  
44. Id. at 86–88. 
45. Consider the refusal of nominees to discuss their views about cases, which is 
generally echoed by sitting justices for similar reasons.  Robert Post & Reva Siegel, 
300 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:285
filtered through a lens of maintaining their public impartiality and 
the court’s image as independent and objective. 
Without a direct measure from the justices themselves, a proxy 
measure of a justice’s likely leanings fits best.  One approach 
common in political science is to attribute to an appointee the 
known positions of their appointer.46  This works under the logic 
that when politicians appoint actors (such as justices), they do so 
with the goal of picking a likeminded individual—liberal governors 
pick justices that they believe will be liberal justices.  For example, 
Giles and Peppers use information about the President and home-
state senators as a proxy measure for the liberalism or conservatism 
of appointments to the federal bench.47  Bonica applied this to 
judges, crediting judges with the ideology of their appointing 
governor.48 
Of course, appointers and appointees are rarely perfectly 
aligned, as Republican presidents have repeatedly found after 
placing a perceived “conservative” on the court.49  Still, Republican 
and Democratic governors likely have different agendas in picking 
high court justices, and one might expect that this has an effect on 
some justices’ holdings in criminal cases.  Figure 7 shows the vote 
percentages made by appointees of each governor.  Thus, the bar 
labeled Patrick represents the percentage of pro-defendant votes 
taken by appointees of Governor Deval Patrick. 
Questioning Justice: Law and Politics in Judicial Confirmation Hearings, 115 YALE L.J. 
POCKET PART 38, 38 (2006). 
46. See generally Michael Giles, Virginia Hettinger & Todd Peppers, Picking 
Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisan Selection Agendas, 54 POL. RES. Q. 623 
(2001). 
47. Id. 
48. Adam Bonica & Michael J. Woodruff, A Common-Space Measure of State 
Supreme Court Ideology, J.L. ECON. & ORG. (Oct. 22, 2014).  Note that Bonica’s 
approach is to give individuals a rating based on their recorded campaign finance 
behavior.  Since conservatives are more likely to donate campaign funds to, and receive 
campaign donations from, other conservatives, it is possible to create a score based on 
the relationships between donors and recipients.  Adam Bonica, Mapping the 
Ideological Marketplace, 58 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 367 (2014).  In the second 2014 article, 
Bonica applied this approach to state supreme court justices, but since appointed 
justices often have little or no involvement in campaign finance, they lacked the 
necessary data to form such a score.  Bonica & Woodruff, supra note 48 at 10–11.  For 
many of these justices, Bonica & Woodruff applied the score of the governor that 
appointed them.  Id. 
49. Consider, for example, Justice John Paul Stevens, a Nixon and Ford 
appointee who ended his career as one of the Court’s liberal standard-bearers 
according to the scores developed by Andrew Martin and Kevin Quinn. Martin & 
Quinn, supra note 36. 
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XI. LESSONS FROM THESE ANALYSES 
These data reveal interesting attributes of the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court.  First, defendants lose a large majority of 
their appeals before the court.  Despite this fact continuing through 
to 2014, there has been some movement towards more pro-
defendant decisions in recent years.  Two other facts about the 
court’s criminal law activity quickly become apparent: the vast 
majority of criminal cases are decided unanimously and most cases 
feature less than the full complement of justices—creating some 
randomness in the composition of the court for any one appeal.  
Analyses of individual justices’ votes show that unanimity restricts 
variation to a small band between twenty-five and thirty-five 
percent in favor of defendants.  The more favorable and 
unfavorable justices to defendants are not that different in their 
total pro-defendant vote rates. 
However, there is considerably more variation in the small set 
of non-unanimous cases, which likely feature the most tightly 
fought legal arguments.  In these cases, sufficiently strong 
arguments were made on each side that they each won at least one 
vote from one of the foremost jurists in the state.  It is in these 
cases where the prevailing law is less clear, where the “right” 
outcome is not always apparent, and where reasonable and 
informed minds may differ.  Thus, these cases are also most likely 
to feature the justices’ own predispositions, values, beliefs, and 
favored policy outcomes.  Despite this, there is little evidence of 
systematic differences between Republican and Democratic 
appointees.  Democratic appointees to the court have been just 
about as favorable to defendants as Republican appointees have, 
despite the preferences of the parties diverging on criminal 
punitiveness.  There is some evidence that Governor Deval 
Patrick’s appointees have been more willing to consider 
defendants’ arguments than their predecessors, and that his 
appointments effectively moved the median of the court in a pro-
defendant direction, but these differences are not dramatic.  
Overall, these analyses imply a court whose selection process– 
appointment by partisan governors–does not significantly politicize 
the court’s criminal jurisprudence.  And it also reveals a court that 
balances a considerable workload by coming to substantial 
agreement and unanimity, revealing their differences in only a 
small number of meaningful cases. 
